December 16, 2010
Prabhakaran had to rely on the idea of a Tamil kingdom that was purported to have existed in the north to push for Tamil Eelam. And it continues to remain central to some of the current political parties too for obvious reasons: their very survival depends on the claim that attracts votes.
The main argument for not disturbing the existing pattern of land settlement in the north hinges on the claimed existence of an ancient Tamil kingdom. But this has been disputed by eminent historians, among them Professor Karthigesu Indrapala of the Jaffna University, Mudliyar C. Rasanayagam, Bernard Gunatillake and a host of others. The available evidence in fact, suggests the contrary. As noted by Prof. S Ranwella if there had been an independent Tamil kingdom in and around the Jaffna peninsula in ancient times, at least a few Tamil inscriptions of those kings who ruled in that kingdom should have come to light in and around the Jaffna peninsula. But so far not a single Tamil inscription, or any other inscription testifying to it has been discovered.
It is interesting that the earliest Tamil inscription discovered in the Jaffna District is by a Sinhalese king, namely Parakramabahu I(1153-1186) who ruled at Polonnaruwa. This inscription was found at the entrance to the famous Nakapusani-Amman Temple in the small island now know as Nainativu or Nagadipa; and it contains certain trade regulations concerning wreckages off the port of Uratturai i.e. present day Kayts (UCR. Vol.XXI, pp.63-70). In the words of Dr. Karthigesu Indrapala, the editor of this inscription ‘the fact that this edict was issued not by any subordinate official, but by the king himself shows that the monarch was in supreme control of the northern most region of the island (UCR.Vo.XXI,p.66). A map of Yapanaya or Jaffanapatnam recently found in the Beeldbank National Archives, in the Netherlands done in 1695 had more than 85% off all villages with Sinhalese names[1].
There is also ample evidence readily available in chronicles, records of foreign visitors to Sri Lanka and in contemporary inscriptions indicating that there were large and extensive Sinhalese settlements there from very early times and that the Sinhalese kings, from the beginning of the historical period up to the middle of the 18th century and thereafter the Nayakkar kings of the Kandyan kingdom up to its fall in 1815 were the lawful rulers of and the legal heirs to the Jaffna region.[2]
In view of the existence of a large body of literature on the subject it is not intended to delve into it in more detail here. But in spite of the evidence to the contrary the traditional homeland idea will continue to be pushed by some politicians, INGOs and a section of the media, more for their own benefit than in helping to clarify issues. To deal with the issue in a reasoned manner the government needs to develop a land settlement policy that addresses current realities and helps promote the national interest and democratic values.
An objective basis for addressing the problem
The President has quite rightly pointed out recently that limiting settlement to a particular group or community cannot be justified in a democracy where its citizens should be able to acquire property rights anywhere in the country. In fact recent history of Sri Lanka suggests this facility has been widely used by Tamil people. According to the census data for 1981 and 2001 the population of Sri Lankan Tamils in the Colombo district increased from 10 to 11 per cent, in Kalutara from 1.2 to 1.3 per cent, in Galle 0.9 to 1.3 per cent, in Puttalam from 6.6 to 6.9 per cent and in Ratnapura from 2.4 to 3.4 per cent[3].
In absolute numbers the increase in the Tamil population in the greater Colombo region was 82,365. The city along with the adjacent urban areas of Dehiwala-Mount Lavinia, Kolonnawa and Kotte have accounted for 75,954 (or, 92% of the total district increase).
This increase, moreover, was brought about by the immigration of Tamils into the area from the north-east. As indicated in a post-census publication of the Department of Census & Statistics (2004), out of the total of 206,310 ‘life-time immigrants’ resident in the Colombo city in 2001, 54,732 had migrated from source areas in the north-east, with Jaffna District alone contributing 41,248 to this segment of the population[4].
These are telling statistics. They show that the Tamil people used their democratic right to move around in choosing where they wanted to live. It also shows that contrary to the LTTE claims of genocide by the Sinhalese, ordinary Tamils preferred to leave their ‘homeland’ to live among the Sinhalese even after the 1983 riots.
It was not only the Tamil community that has shown such a high degree of mobility. Census data for the Colombo district shows that the Sri Lankan Moor population also increased at a similar rate during the period.
Given this background it is surprising that some politicians raise concerns regarding the reverse flow of population to predominantly Tamil areas. The government, as part of facilitating democratic process, needs not only to support such migrations but also to remove any legal or other impediments to such flows.
National priorities
One of the key objectives of President Rajapaksa’s agenda for his second term is doubling of per capita income. High among the requirements for achieving this is the productive use of the country’s resources in particular, land and labour. The past policy of colonization was based on this principle of moving people to where the land resources were and it paid off handsomely with vastly increased paddy production. A first approximation for the basis of such a move is related to population density. Density measures the population per square kilometer of land. Census department data for 2009 shows that the average density of population for the country is 312 per square kilometre. Some districts, such as Colombo, have almost 12 times this average. At the other extreme is the district of Mannar, which has a population density of only 16 per cent of the average. (See table 1)
TABLE 1:POPULATION DENSITY
| District | Area (km²) | Census of 1981-03-17 | 2009-07-01 | 2009 Density | ||||||||||||||||
| Colombo | 699 | 1,699,241 | 2,521,000 | 3607 | ||||||||||||||||
| Gampaha | 1,387 | 1,390,862 | 2,165,000 | 1561 | ||||||||||||||||
| Kandy | 1,940 | 1,048,317 | 1,415,000 | 729 | ||||||||||||||||
| Kalutara | 1,598 | 829,704 | 1,128,000 | 706 | ||||||||||||||||
| Galle | 1,652 | 814,531 | 1,074,000 | 650 | ||||||||||||||||
| Matara | 1,283 | 643,786 | 831,000 | 648 | ||||||||||||||||
| Jaffna | 1,025 | 738,788 | 607,000 | 592 | ||||||||||||||||
| Kegalla | 1,693 | 684,944 | 813,000 | 480 | ||||||||||||||||
| Nuwara Eliya | 1,741 | 603,577 | 755,000 | 434 | ||||||||||||||||
| Ratnapura | 3,275 | 797,087 | 1,113,000 | 340 | ||||||||||||||||
| Kurunegala | 4,816 | 1,211,801 | 1,550,000 | 322 | ||||||||||||||||
| Sri Lanka | 65,610 | 14846750 | 20,450,000 | 312 | ||||||||||||||||
| Badulla | 2,861 | 640,952 | 874,000 | 305 | ||||||||||||||||
| Puttalam | 3,072 | 492,533 | 770,000 | 251 | ||||||||||||||||
| Matale | 1,993 | 357,354 | 490,000 | 246 | ||||||||||||||||
| Hambantota | 2,609 | 424,344 | 565,000 | 217 | ||||||||||||||||
| Batticaloa | 2,854 | 330,333 | 537,000 | 188 | ||||||||||||||||
| Ampara | 4,415 | 388,970 | 634,000 | 144 | ||||||||||||||||
| Trincomalee | 2,727 | 255,948 | 368,000 | 135 | ||||||||||||||||
| Polonnaruwa | 3,293 | 261,563 | 405,000 | 123 | ||||||||||||||||
| Kilinochchi | 1,279 | 91,764 | 154,000 | 120 | ||||||||||||||||
| Anuradhapura | 7,179 | 587,929 | 820,000 | 114 | ||||||||||||||||
| Vavuniya | 1,967 | 95,428 | 169,000 | 86 | ||||||||||||||||
| Moneragala | 5,639 | 273,570 | 435,000 | 77 | ||||||||||||||||
| Mullaitivu | 2,617 | 77,189 | 154,000 | 59 | ||||||||||||||||
| Mannar | 1,996 | 106,235 | 103,000 | 52 | ||||||||||||||||
| Source: Department of Census and Statistics | ||||||||||||||||||||
A logical basis to spread the population to less populated regions is colonisation of sparsely populated areas.
But this will require meeting at least two other conditions: sufficient arable land and adequate supply of water for irrigation. Although it may appear that some regions, especially in the arid zone, are not suitable for colonisation because of low rainfall modern technology allows for diversion of waterways to most parts Sri Lanka being a small island.
But at the same time it is worth noting that present day growth need not be limited to maximising output from the land since the service sector too can contribute enormously to the GDP. Having a relatively educated workforce may allow Sri Lanka to develop knowledge-based industries, which do not have to be necessarily located in Colombo or in close proximity. If call centres in Mumbai can answer the telephone of a New York based company, working from Hambantota or Point Pedro should not pose major problems.
Prevention of terrorism
Settlements also have major implications in terms of preventing terrorism. For instance to fire the first salvo in the Eelam war IV, Prabhakaran closed the Mavil Aru anicut on 26 July 2006, which supplied water to 30,000 farmers downstream. In retrospect, that may appear as a stupid idea since he was on the run from then on. But in fact it was part of a LTTE master plan to recapture Jaffna. The LTTE followed the closing of the anicut by attacks a week later, on army detachments at Kattaparichchan, Mahindapura and Pahalathoppur all with the aim of taking full control of the area surrounding the Trincomalee harbour and creating a land corridor to the north. It was also to allow free access to the Habarana-Trincomalee main supply route. All these were of critical importance to recapture the LTTE’s crown jewel, Jaffna peninsula. But a major obstacle to achieving this was the Sinhalese settlements south of Trincomalee especially in Kallar, Somapura and Serunuwara. These farmers relied on water from Mavil Aru and the first phase of the war was to drive them away by cutting off water supply[5].
But when that failed, with severe loss of manpower, the LTTE withdrew with the plan to capture Jaffna in tatters. This was a defining moment in Eelam War IV. Prabhakaran was banking on inflicting severe damage on the armed forces at Mavil Aru before moving on to capturing the Jaffna peninsula. But all that failed and from then on Prabhakaran was unable to determine the course of Eelam War IV.
There is an important lesson in the LTTE’s failure to recapture Jaffna. The Sinhalese settlements in Kallar, Somapura, Serunuwara and surrounding regions that interspersed with other communities formed a bulwark which the LTTE could not penetrate. Yet it was necessary for the LTTE to do this before it could take control of the Trincomalee harbour and create a passage to the north and access to the Habarana-Trincomalee supply route. Their inability to achieve this was a major reason for the Tiger failure. It proved that settlement by a mix of communities, instead of vast regions comprising a single community, is an effective barrier against covert activities by terrorists groups.
Other issues
Allowing for freer mobility of people to areas occupied predominantly by one community may in the long term dilute political representation. This may not pose major problems as evident from the way it has been handled in the Colombo region with multi-member electorates etc. Any major concerns regarding minorities should be addressed at the centre to ensure adequate representation in parliament for these groups. In this regard, among other things, the idea of a second chamber holds promise.
In summary, an active land settlement policy is critically important at this juncture both to promote democratic values in the community and support national objectives. The government should not be dissuaded by arguments of groups that survive on perpetuating sanctity of a mythical homeland.
[1] http://www.jaffnahistory.com/Northern_Province/Sinhala_Villages_of_Jaffna_1695.html
[2] Prof. S.Ranwella, The so-called Tamil kingdom of Jaffna: Paper submitted to Sansoni Commission.
[3] S. Maduraperuma, The census of population and housing, 2001. http://www.ancsdaap.org/cencon2002/papers/Sri%20Lanka/SriLanka.pdf
[4] G.H.Peiris, Ethnic relations in Sri Lanka: conflict or concord?, Lanka Guardian, http://www.srilankaguardian.org/2009/03/ethnic-relations-in-sri-lanka-conflict.html
[5] Don Wijewardana, How LTTE Lost the Eelam War, Stamford Lake Publications, 2010
