Sri Lanka signs UN resolution on combating terrorism, bans 16 LTTE organizations

ColomboPage News Desk, Sri Lanka.




Apr 01, Colombo: Sri Lanka today in a decisive measure signed the United Nations Security Council Resolution 1373, which sets out strategies to combat terrorism and to control terrorist financing.

With the signing of the Resolution 1373, the Sri Lankan government has banned the Tamil Tiger terrorist organization, Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) and 15 other Tamil diaspora groups that are alleged of having terror links and involved in reviving the terrorist movement in the country.

Prof. G.L. Peiris, Minister of External Affairs signed the order and it will be published in the Government Gazette shortly, the External Affairs Ministry said in a statement.

According to the Ministry statement, the order is based on the recommendation by the Secretary, Ministry of Defence and Urban Development, as the Competent Authority regarding the identification of persons, groups and entities, believed on reasonable grounds to be committing, attempting to commit, facilitating or participating, in the commission of acts of terrorism.

Under the Regulation all funds, assets and economic resources belonging to or owned by the designated persons or entities will remain frozen until the organizations are removed from the designated list.
In terms of the Regulation moving, transferring or dealing with frozen assets without the permission of the Competent Authority are prohibited and any person who fails to comply with an order to freeze assets is liable to heavy penalties.

Any contact with the proscribed organizations is a violation of the regulation.

The government's move comes in the wake of UN Human Rights Council adopting an intrusive resolution to investigate alleged human rights violations only during the last seven years of the government's war against the Tamil Tiger terrorists. The resolution effectively eliminates the investigations into the major crimes committed by the LTTE prior to 2002 in the 30-year long war. The Sri Lankan government recently revealed foreign attempts to revive the defeated terrorist organization in the North with the support from the diaspora funds.
According to Sri Lankan defense authorities K.P. Selvanayagam a.k.a. 'Gobi', an LTTE cadre escaped after the end of the war and fled overseas, has returned to the island to lead the revival of the terrorist organization.

Among the organizations proscribed are the LTTE's Trans National Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) headed by New York lawyer Visuvanathan Ruthirakumaran, Global Tamil Forum (GTF), which is headed by Fr.SJ Emmanuel and active in Europe, and the UK-based British Tamil Forum (BTF).

The 15 organizations proscribed are controlled by four individuals, Defense Ministry spokesman Brigadier Ruwan Wanigasooriya said. The organizations are functioning in several countries including USA, Canada, UK, Australia, Norway, Italy, Switzerland, and France.

The other organizations banned are Tamil Rehabilitation Organization (TRO), Tamil Coordinating Committee (TCC), World Tamil Movement (WTM), Canadian Tamil Congress (CTC), Australian Tamil Congress (ATC), National Council Of Canadian Tamils, Tamil National Council (TNC), Tamil Youth Organization (TYO), World Tamil Coordinating Committee (WTCC), Tamil Eelam Peoples Assembly, World Tamil Relief Fund and Headquarters Group.

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SL bans LTTE fronts

By D.B.S. Jeyaraj
March 31, 2014

The Sri Lankan government has in a decisive move with far reaching implications proscribed as foreign terrorist entities, several overseas organizations suspected of being fronts of the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE).

The government banned the organizations as “foreign terrorists” utilising the UN Security Council Resolution 1373 which was brought about by the USA on September 28, 2001 after the attack on World Trader Center in New York on September 11, 2001.

It is expected that External Affairs Minister Prof. Gamini Lakshman Peiris will announce details of the proscription imposed on such foreign terrorist entities later this week.

The report said:
“It is learnt that the Sri Lankan ministry of External Affairs has gazetted legislation outlawing several organizations reportedly functioning in several countries including the USA, Canada Britain, Norway, Italy, Switzerland, France and Australia.

“Among organizations proscribed are the Transnational Government of Tamil Eelam (TGTE) headed by New York lawyer Visuvanathan Ruthirakumaran,Global Tamil Forum headed by Catholic Priest Fr.SJ Emmanuel,the LTTE group led by Perinbanayagam Sivaparan alias Nediyavan and the tiger group led by Sekarampillai Vinayagamoorthy alias Vinayagam.

It is expected that External Affairs minister Prof.Gamini Lakshman Peiris will announce details of the proscription imposed on such foreign terrorist entities later this week.

The proscribed entities listed in the Gazette consist of the main LTTE and 15 other alleged front organizations of the tigers.The proscribed organizations are as follows-

01. Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam a.k.a LTTE a.k.a Tamil Tigers.
02. Tamil Rehabilitation Organization a.k.a TRO.
03. Tamil Coordinating Committee a.k.a TCC
04. British Tamil Forum a.k.a BTF
05. World Tamil Movement a.k.a WTM
06. Canadian Tamil Congress a.k.a CTC
07. Australian Tamil Congress a.k.a ATC
08. Global Tamil Forum a.k.a GTF
09. National Council Of Canadian Tamils a.k.a NCCT a.k.a Makkal Avai
10. Tamil National Council a.k.a TNC
11.Tamil Youth Organization a.k.a TYO
12. World Tamil Coordinating Committee a.k.a WTCC.
13. Transnational Government Of Tamil Eelam a.k.a TGTE
14. Tamil Eelam Peoples Assembly a.k.a TEPA
15 .World Tamil Relief Fund a.k.a WTRF
16. Headquarters Group a.k.a HQ Group

According to authoritative sources the organizations listed as suspected terrorist entities functioning on foreign soil fall under four broad categories reportedly under the overall control of four key individuals.
They are the organization/s under-

1. Perinbanayagam Sivaparan alias “Nediyavan”;
2. Rev.Fr. SJ Emmanuel
3. Visuvanathan Ruthirakumaran
4. Sekarampillai Vinayakamoorthy alias Vinayagam

Explaing further the rationale behind such proscription at this juncture, informed sources stated that the fundamental objective was to appraise foreign countries, particularly Western nations of how LTTE fronts existing amidst members of the Tamil Diaspora resident on their soil were now financing the revival of LTTE activity in Sri Lanka.

The Government is concerned about the recent attempt to revive the LTTE in Sri Lanka. All evidence unearthed so far indicate that funds, support and assistance from LTTE front organizations are primarily responsible for the attempted tiger renaissance in Sri Lanka.

Since the UN resolution 1373 expects countries to assist one another to combat terrorism, Sri Lanka will request the host countries to investigate the activities of such organizations and key members on their soil and take appropriate action.

Sri Lanka will provide particulars about such key activists as authorities in Sri Lanka are in possession of the entire data base of former LTTE senior leader Veerakathy Manivannan alias Castro who was in charge of the LTTE international secretariat which directed and coordinated overseas LTTE activity until early 2009.

Castro simply abandoned his office in Pudukudiyiruppu and escaped when the Sri Lankan armed forces advanced thereby letting the data base with particulars of overseas LTTE activity fall easily into the lap of the security forces.

The Government is also likely to obtain cooperation from these Western countries to proclaim LTTE activists abroad as offenders” listed as Wanted or to be watched through related INTERPOL notices.

Speaking further authoritative sources said that as a result of the proscription coming into force Sri Lankan nationals in the Island will be forbidden to maintain contact or links with members of the proscribed organizations. This would prevent Sri Lankan political parties and leaders from obtaining funds from such entities for undertakings in Sri Lanka. This move is likely to affect several members of Tamil political parties in Sri Lanka.

This would also forbid Sri Lankan politicians and Non –Governmental Organization (NGO) activists being in contact with representatives of such entities either in Sri Lanka or during trips abroad.

Sections of the media in Sri Lanka giving wide coverage to statements and interviews given by officials of such organizations will also be restricted from doing so.

Furthermore, the proscription will also render members of these proscribed entities liable for arrest under the Prevention of Terrorism Act(PTA) if and when apprehended while visiting Sri Lanka.

It is learnt that extensive dossiers of key individuals from these proscribed organizations and their activities abroad would be provided to the respective countries concerned in due course.

Sri Lankan authorities are expected to strictly enforce provisions of the proscription under UN resolution 1373 after the Sinhala –Tamil New Year in April this year.

Lest We Forget in 2014: Reflections on the Tigers

By Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe

TheDiplomat.com

May 21, 2010

A year after the LTTE’s defeat, evidence shows criticism of Sri Lanka’s army is misplaced, says Sergei DeSilva-Ranasinghe.

A year ago this week, the Sri Lankan government officially declared victory over the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE) in one of the most extraordinary counter-insurgency campaigns in recent times.
The endgame of the conflict, particularly from January to May 2009, saw the bloodiest fighting, often with the presence of tens of thousands of civilians that the LTTE desperately used to fend off its inevitable defeat. Since then, new evidence has become public that offers further insights into the final months of Sri Lanka’s secessionist civil war.

For decades, the jungle-laden Mullaitivu District, located in Sri Lanka’s northeast, served as the LTTE’s main stronghold. However, under significant military pressure from the Sri Lankan Army during the final stages of the conflict, the LTTE conducted a fighting retreat towards its last bastion astride the Mullaitivu coastline.

As it did so, the LTTE used all means at its disposal to inflict casualties to delay, halt or even push back the Army’s advance. For example, the LTTE constructed a series of embankments between two and three metres high, also known as earth bunds, which proved to be formidable defensive obstacles. Assault troops also encountered camouflaged LTTE armour plated bunkers.

According to one frontline Army officer from the time: ‘You don’t know where they are, and you can’t even see them until your right on them…The first you know is when you are wounded in the leg. All we can do is to fire towards the sound, throw grenades and send off RPGs [Rocket Propelled Grenades] in the general direction.’

In addition, frontline infantry often confronted elaborately laid LTTE minefields that required field engineers equipped with Bangalore torpedoes to clear pathways. Similarly, the LTTE cleverly utilised booby traps made of discarded rubbish and metal that were tied to hidden explosive caches dispersed over a wide area that when triggered caused multiple and devastating explosions.

Each passing month saw increasingly fierce combat. Reports suggested that the Army absorbed anywhere between 10 and 20 fatalities per day—sometimes more—while the Army claims that the LTTE suffered average losses ranging from 25 to 40 combatants per day. Due to high levels of attrition and the need to augment its depleted conventional formations, the LTTE had little choice than to continue to rely heavily on forced recruitment of civilians, a practice that it revived full-scale in late 2007.

To ensure a ready supply of civilians, the LTTE adopted a series of coercive measures such as that reported in one Sri Lankan newspaper which quoted a 14-year-old female child soldier saying the LTTE had warned her that her family would be punished if she didn’t join. Indeed, the Army confirmed that an increasing number of conscripts were seen at the frontline, notably child soldiers. ‘It’s like looking at your own child. Quite large numbers [of the LTTE fighters killed or captured] are under 16,’ one Army Brigadier told the Telegraph. ‘They grab them from their parents and [when] they try to pull them back they [the parents] get shot. These children have dog tags and cyanide capsules.’ Indeed, it was later revealed, according to the independent Sri Lankan daily, The Island, that in the final months of the war the LTTE planned to carry out a massive offensive against the Army with 300 suicide bombers, but was forced to cancel it as many suicide bombers were either killed in action or deserted to government-controlled territory.

The incidence of civilian casualties was low prior to the commencement of the Mullaitivu campaign, as combat was essentially between two conventional armies in the field, and civilian concentrations were situated far from the fighting.

However, as the territory controlled by the LTTE rapidly contracted, the density of trapped civilians increased rapidly, meaning civilians were often being caught in the crossfire. In an effort to provide safe passage from the combat zone, the Sri Lankan government declared two limited ceasefires, which saw civilian safe zones created at Vishwamadu and Oddusudan. However, such measures were doomed to failure when the LTTE rejected them and chose not to offer any alternative locations.

According to Tamil journalist DBS Jeyaraj: ‘The Sri Lankan government had…declared two limited ceasefires. But the LTTE imposed further restrictions and the number of civilians coming out dropped during ceasefire days…the LTTE exploited the ceasefire in February to mount a very effective counter strike…The April ceasefire was used to construct several new “trench-cum-bund” defences.’

Meanwhile, the LTTE positioned its artillery and mortar assets near or amidst civilian concentrations, tactics confirmed by a range of media outlets including Reuters India in February 2009, which quoted a 74-year old Catholic nun as claiming: ‘The LTTE fired from close to civilians. We had objected, but that didn’t work.’
Out of desperation, thousands of civilians defied the LTTE edict, forbidding any civilians from leaving LTTE-controlled territory, and attempted to escape under cover of darkness and brave crossfire from running battles, LTTE-laid minefields and LTTE fire targeting escaping civilians.

At a press conference in Colombo last July, Dr. Shanmugaraja, a former LTTE physician who surrendered in the final weeks of the war, said: ‘Many civilians were killed and wounded as the LTTE opened fire at them when they tried to flee from the Tiger’s grip…Their strategy was to keep the civilians around them and survive. That was why they came along with civilians once safe zones were demarcated for the civilians by the Security Forces.’

In addition, there’s ample evidence to suggest that civilians in LTTE-controlled territory were integrated into the LTTE military-logistical system and war effort. For example, Sri Lankan-Australian scholar Michael Roberts, an expert on Sri Lankan politics and anthropology, wrote in his article, Dilemma’s at War’s End: ‘All young people seem to have been inducted as auxiliaries. As they lost territory, the LTTE also used heavy machinery and marshalled labour to build ditches and embankments…a task that clearly involved massive logistical operations.’
 

He added: ‘In effect, over the last year or so, many able-bodied people in the LTTE command state have been rendered into an integral part of their logistical support for war, being more or less part of the frontline. In such circumstances, of course, the category “civilian” is an ambiguous category.’

In fact, the presence of more than 280,000 civilians in LTTE-controlled territory served a clear and diverse purpose, which was highlighted in their use as military labour to build fortifications; porters shuttling food, ammunition and supplies to frontline LTTE units; of manpower to augment the LTTE’s military strength; human shields that gave the LTTE significant bargaining power with the international community to call for a permanent ceasefire; and the maintenance of its supply lines.

In effect, the LTTE depended indirectly almost entirely on regular Sri Lankan government convoys to areas under enemy control for food, medicine and essential items—an extraordinary situation. Another former LTTE physician, Dr. Vardharaja, elaborated on this exploiting of civilians by the LTTE to ensure supplies kept coming in, when he said: ‘The problem was that the LTTE took medicine from us to treat their injured. They asked us to tell the media that we don’t have medicine. There was as a shortage of medicine because LTTE took the whole stock.’

By mid-April 2009, the Army had successfully repulsed all LTTE counterattacks and finally cornered the group on a sliver of territory along the coast, 13 kilometres long and just 3 kilometres wide. The LTTE decided to stage its last stand in its coastal stronghold with an estimated 240,000 civilians still present, leaving the Army facing an unprecedented difficulty of capturing the last patch of land while ensuring civilians’ safety.

It is this reality that underscores how misplaced the international criticism of the military’s conduct in the final stages of the civil war was. On February 9, for example, a suicide bomber reportedly infiltrated an internally displaced persons registration camp and detonated her suicide jacket, killing 8 civilians and 24 soldiers. On April 20, 3 LTTE suicide bombers infiltrated and detonated their suicide jackets, killing 17 civilians and injuring 200. The LTTE shrewdly used tents, make-shift shelters and bunkers to conceal snipers, machine gun nests and artillery/mortar emplacements, which were often merged with civilian dwellings. Given this, assault troops had no choice but to systematically clear tens of thousands of tents, makeshift shelters, bunkers and trenches, which left them exposed to LTTE ambushes laid inside tents, makeshift shelters or subterranean bunkers. As such, in an attempt to mitigate the incidence of civilian casualties, the Army relied heavily on dozens of trained snipers to great effect in neutralizing LTTE combatants.

In the final weeks of the war, the LTTE continued to aggressively conscript civilians who were given crash training and assigned to scratch units at the frontline. For instance, in a now public April 2009 report, Rajan Hoole, who heads the dissident Tamil University Teachers for Human Rights (Jaffna) and who is known for his criticism of both the Sri Lankan government and the LTTE, pointed to conversations with civilians who fled LTTE controlled territory.

‘The LTTE has recently started the practice of sending out teams of 6 cadres with instructions for each team to return with 30 conscripts,’ Hoole wrote. ‘If they fail they are reportedly subject to heavy and often lethal punishment.’

However, the LTTE’s efforts were in vain. After bitter fighting on May 16 and 17, the last civilians were extracted from the combat zone, leaving 400 hardcore LTTE leaders and fighters exposed. By the morning of May 19, the LTTE lay defeated and its leaders eliminated, bringing a decisive end to the nearly three decade long Sri Lankan civil war. The Army’s final operation involved 4 weeks of heavy fighting and the loss of over 500 soldiers.

The evidence revealed by the LTTE’s own former sympathisers indicates the lengths the group was willing to go to and the difficulties facing conventional militaries confronting a fanatical adversary that conducts itself with impunity. Under such circumstances it’s unrealistic to believe civilian casualties can be avoided. Indeed, the very success of the Army in extracting more than 280,000 civilians from the combat zone from January to May 2009, despite this effort contributing to it suffering heavy casualties in process, is an indication of the complexity of conducting military operations in an environment where an enemy is willing use civilians as a key element of its military strategy.

Civilian casualties are, of course, tragic. But the endgame of Sri Lanka’s civil war requires a much more in-depth and nuanced understanding of the dilemmas that faced the Army before any conclusions can be drawn.

Sri Lanka’s Growing Links with China

By Jack Goodman

TheDiplomat.com

March 06, 2014

 Trade, investment and a strategic Indian Ocean location bring the two countries closer together.

 

“We love this country,” declared a Chinese Foreign Minister on a state visit to Sri Lanka in 1971, China “was ready to give its fullest co-operation to speed up the socialist march of Ceylon.”
Sri Lanka’s socialist “march” didn’t ever quite catch up with China’s, but since the first Rubber-Rice pact was signed in 1952 China-Sri Lankan relations have been a source of unity and continue on an upward trajectory today.

As China’s economic power has grown, investing overseas has been a tactic used across the world by China to help bolster the national interest. Its financial foreign policy rests on two strategies: “accumulating foreign currency reserves and sending money abroad in the form of FDI, aid, assistance and loans,” wrote U.S. economic advisor Ken Miller in Foreign Affairs.  Sri Lanka is a model for the latter part of this strategy.
The statistics alone indicate the inexorable rise of China’s financial stake in Sri Lanka.

Impending confirmation of a free trade agreement (FTA) between the two countries is symbolic of the tight-knit relations between Beijing and Colombo in 2014. Bilateral trade exceeded $3 billion for 2013 and China is Sri Lanka’s second largest source of imports behind India.

Despite the symbolism, China will profit more from the generous new tariffs of the FTA. Sri Lanka has a growing trade deficit with China that stood at approximately $2.4 billion in 2012. China is the destination for less than 2 percent of total Sri Lankan exports.

However, concerns over trade deficits for South Asian nations like Sri Lanka are “outweighed by overall economic benefits and political support,” wrote India’s former Special Envoy to Southeast Asian countries on UN Security Council Reforms, Professor S D. Muni.

China is Sri Lanka’s biggest source of foreign direct investment (FDI) as well as providing development loans for projects such as the $500 million new Colombo Port Terminal, Hambantota Port, Sri Lanka’s first four-lane expressway, and a new National Theatre, among others. These lucrative benefits for Sri Lanka have played a pivotal role in building the current relationship.

The recent commitment from Sri Lanka to join the Maritime Silk Road (MSR) indicates the proximity of the two states’ strategic aspirations and is a reflection of the assimilation of national interests. The Indian Ocean ports of Gwadar in Pakistan, Hambantota in Sri Lanka and Chittagong in Bangladesh have all benefited from Chinese investment and account for 30 percent of global trade, according to Indian Ocean Rim Association.
The MSR is a vital strategic project for China in the Indian Ocean, and will increase China’s presence in South Asian shipping routes. Sri Lanka can be seen as a gateway port up the western coast of India and further west to Iran, a vital exporter of oil to China. The brand new port of Hambantota, 85 percent of it paid for with a Chinese loan, is located on the south of the island, historically not a traditional shipping route. However, it is the perfect location to meet the strategic objectives of the MSR.

Supplementing the impact of economic relations, the political consequences of this month’s United Nations Human Rights Council (UNHRC) decision over the U.S.-led resolution that calls for an independent investigation into the end of the Sri Lankan civil war could be significant. The Indian External Affairs Minister Salman Kurshid delivered a warning to Sri Lanka, calling on it to find “possible ways to avoid an hostile attitude towards people and countries that matter.”

In face of these Western-led accusations, Sri Lanka have found a political ally in China through a shared policy of non-interference in internal affairs. This translates as China’s view that issues in relation to human rights are the prerogative of the sovereign state to deal with internally. China’s soft power in Sri Lanka will grow, almost unintentionally, if Colombo’s disenfranchisement with the West continues over the matter of an independent investigation. Despite a recent “curveball” in the form of a comment from the Chinese Foreign Ministry, China has always pledged support for Sri Lanka:
“China opposes some countries’ interference in the internal affairs of Sri Lanka under the pretext of human rights issues,” Foreign Minister Wang Yi told his Sri Lankan counterpart G. L. Peiris in Beijing recently.
Chinese influence in Sri Lanka is clearly growing, but the possibility that Colombo is driving this relationship can’t be overlooked. Noises from Sri Lankan government and other figures suggest that they are fully in control of what is officially known as a “Strategic Cooperative Partnership.” In this context China is playing a pivotal role in Sri Lanka’s regional development in South Asia.

At the heart of this is Sri Lanka’s objective to fulfill its commercial potential as the country at the geographic center of the Indian Ocean. Former Sri Lankan Ambassador to China Nihal Rodrigo, speaking at a South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) event last year, didn’t express concern over China’s naval expansion and development of South Asian ports, but rather claimed that it “provides it (China) easier connectivity across the Indian Ocean which benefits South Asia.” Both governments therefore have something to gain from Hamantota Port, described as one aspect of Sri Lanka’s “five-hub” growth strategy, which aims to position and build the island as a global naval, aviation, commercial, energy and knowledge center.

Hamantota Port was “commercial in nature” and not to be “misconstrued as fitting the string of pearls paradigm,” said Defence Secretary Gotabaya Rajapaksa at the 2012 Galle Dialogue. This countered accusations from some American scholars that China had intentions to encircle India beyond innocently increasing trade links.

The Maritime Silk Road is therefore perceived as critical for Sri Lanka to become a leading player in the development of Indian Ocean trading ports, which China has more or less augmented itself. Sri Lanka also has an opportunity to build favorable ties with both the region’s superpowers, India and China, as well as the emerging Southeast Asian nations.

There is evidence to suggest that Colombo and Beijing now share policies on a whole range of issues, political and economic. This is in part a reflection of Chinese influence, but it is also attributable to Sri Lanka’s ability to manipulate the relationship in its favor.

China’s role in Sri Lanka should be viewed within a regional South Asian context and not just unilaterally. For now at least, Indian and American fears appear to have little credence.

Jack Goodman is a visiting researcher at the Regional Centre for Strategic Studies, Colombo, Sri Lanka.